Monday, November 16, 2009
Hume: Memories as Inferior Perceptions
I have a hard time agree with Hume's assertion that "the most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest perception." While I do agree that generally there is a loss in "quality" when a perception is commuted to a thought, but I do not think this to be always the case. I believe that this supposed superiority arrives from the complements to the perception, such as adrenaline that is released when a person is confronted by pain. Therefore, it is not truly the perception that is being compared to the thought, but the manipulation by the human body that amplifies the perception that is being compared. If this bare perception is compared to the thought, I believe that a thought can indeed become superior to the perception. This occurs when a thought exaggerates a memory. While Hume is correct to say that a thought will not be the same as the original perception, in that it may not be the same force or vivacity, he is not correct to say that the thought cannot invigorate feelings stronger than the original perception. For example, if a relatively mundane experience, with little perception, is for some reason converted to a rather important memory in a person's mind, the recall of this memory should become stronger than the original perception. If the recall is strong enough, I believe that the same reaction that usually accompanies perception can arise again, like with the adrenaline example. This way, the memory will invoke a greater reaction than the original perception. I have known this to occur in my own life on a few occasions, when an event takes on greater significance later in life.
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You raise an excellent issue, Ethan, when you write that 'While Hume is correct to say that a thought will not be the same as the original perception, in that it may not be the same force or vivacity, he is not correct to say that the thought cannot invigorate feelings stronger than the original perception.' This is an important distinction -- the feeling of the idea (or thought/ memory) versus the *additional* feelings THAT the idea/ thought/ memory can evoke. However, I don't think Hume would disagree -- he's really commenting only on the former (ie, the feeling of the idea itself), and not saying that the latter is not possible (ie, a memory that evokes stronger feelings than the original impression, which does seem possible). An example of what I think you're talking about is something like this: the smell of your beloved the first time you smelled her/ his perfume (etc), which is bound to be stronger than the idea of that smell later -- BUT, let's say that you and your beloved break up; then much stronger emotions (like deep sadness) can newly be evoked by the memory of that smell. Does this make sense??
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